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Research in information and communication technology in education places an increasing emphasis
on the use of qualitative analysis (QA). A considerable number of approaches to QA can be adopted,
but it is not always clear that researchers recognize either the differences between these approaches
or the principles that underlie them. Phenomenography is often identified by researchers as the
approach they have used, but little evidence is presented to allow anyone else to assess the objectiv-
ity of the results produced. This paper attempts to redress the balance. A small-scale evaluation was
designed and conducted according to ‘pure’ phenomenographic principles and guidelines. This
study was then critiqued within the wider context of QA in general. The conclusion is that pure
phenomenography has some procedural weaknesses, as well as some methodological limitations
regarding the scope of the outcomes. The procedural weaknesses can be resolved by taking account
of good practice in QA. The methodological issues are more serious and reduce the value of this
approach for research in collaborative learning environments.
Introduction
This paper presents a critical review of phenomenography as a qualitative research
process for use within information and communication technology in education
(ICTE). In most published studies that have used this approach to qualitative analysis
(QA) the emphasis is on the conclusions reached, and little consideration is given to
the research process or to factors that might restrict the validity or generalizability of
the conclusions.
This paper seeks to redress the balance by presenting a ‘pure’ phenomenographic
study and a critique of the research process that was applied. This critique raises some
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significant problems that need to be addressed if pure phenomenography is to be used
for future research in ICTE.
The most detailed level of analysis (the evaluation study) is focused on the use of
software that was developed within the NetPro II project1 to facilitate group coordi-
nation and management for problem-based learning. The purpose of the evaluation
was to provide qualitative feedback to inform the next stage of design and development
of the software. The design team was particularly interested in how the students
perceived the tool, as opposed to whether the students understood or shared the
designers’ perspective. From a range of approaches that were available, phenomeno-
graphy appeared well suited given the limited period of time during which data could
be collected. The possibility of producing ‘results’ more quickly than with other
approaches to QA was a further advantage. This study followed, as far as possible, the
pure phenomenographic process outlined in Marton and Booth (1997).
The critique of this research (the process study) was based on a quasi-teachback
process (Kidd, 1987) between the researcher on the evaluation study and a second
researcher who had not taken part in the research up to this stage. In this case, the
second researcher acted as an expert in qualitative analysis, and the teachback activity
focused on elaborating the evaluation study within this wider research framework.
The format of this critique allowed the research process to be explored in detail, and
emphasized, in particular, those aspects that are distinctive to phenomenography
rather than common across QA.
This critique revealed a number of weaknesses that need to be addressed in any future
use of phenomenography in ICTE. At the simplest level, the process needs to be revised
to ensure that the method can track the extent to which the researchers’ own values
influence the interpretation and analysis of the data. From a methodological point of
view, it must be recognized that the principles that underlie phenomenography can
only produce a narrow, snapshot model of what understanding might be, and provide
little insight into learning.
The first two sections of this paper provide an introduction to phenomenography
and the evaluation study. The central part of the paper covers the process study and
concentrates on four critical differences between pure phenomenography and other
approaches to QA. Three of these are reviewed within the context of the evaluation
study and challenge the validity of this approach as it is currently presented. The
fourth arises from the process study itself and suggests that there could be strong
limitations to the scope of any phenomenographic research. The conclusions to the
paper integrate these four criticisms and suggest that pure phenomenography, at least
in ICTE, can only improve by becoming less phenomenographic.
Phenomenography
Phenomenography is presented as a model of qualitative research and analysis that is
distinct in its principles, its focus, its methods and its outcomes. The term phenom-
enography was first defined as a distinctive approach to qualitative research and anal-
ysis by Ference Marton in an article in Instructional Science, in which he comments: 
Making sense of ‘pure’ phenomenography in ICTE 243
The kind of research we wish to argue for is complementary to other kinds of research. It
is research which aims at description, analysis, and understanding of experiences; that is,
research which is directed towards experiential description. Such an approach points to a
relatively distinct field of inquiry which we would like to label phenomenography.
(Marton, 1981, p. 185)
This approach evolved over the previous five years in a number of studies in
education that each focused on learning and understanding within a specific subject
(e.g. economics; Dahlgren & Marton, 1978), and even on a specific task within that
subject (e.g. understanding a specific text; Marton & Säljö, 1976a, b). The comple-
mentary nature of this approach, for Marton, is established by distinguishing
phenomenography from other forms of enquiry.
Phenomenographic studies are strictly empirical and non-constructivist (Svensson,
1997, p. 164). Despite the alignment with the empirical tradition, phenomenography
must be distinguished from both conventional science and educational psychology. It
is distinguished from science, as there is no intention to describe an objective world
that is independent of individuals (Marton & Säljö, 1976a). It is distinguished from
educational psychology, as there is no intention to produce a model of the capability
of humans to learn, perceive and/or behave without reference to a specific context
(Marton & Booth, 1997). In contrast, phenomenography studies the inter-relation-
ship between the individual and the objective world, and draws conclusions about
how individuals ‘conceive of various aspects of their reality’ (Marton, 1986, p. 42).
As such, phenomenography is concerned to understand the limitations to the way in
which a specific aspect of the world can be experienced by individuals (Säljö, 1996,
p. 12). Thus, Dahlgren and Marton’s study of students’ understanding in economics
should inform us about the different ways in which that part of economics could be
perceived by any similar student, but would be irrelevant to understanding how the
same students understand a different subject.
Phenomenography must also be clearly distinguished from phenomenology, which
Marton considers to be unnecessarily abstract (Marton, 1981). Phenomenography
does not accept that it is possible to separate ‘that which is experienced from the
experience per se’ (Marton, 1981, p. 180), while phenomenology is concerned to
understand how a subjective perception of ‘essence’ can be understood as distinct
from particular experiences. In addition, where phenomenology is limited to the ‘pre-
reflective level of consciousness … of the taken-for-granted world’, a phenomeno-
graphic study includes ‘both the conceptual and the experiential’, both ‘what is
thought of’ and ‘that which is lived’ (Marton, 1981, p. 180). Where phenomenologists
disagree (Hasselgren & Beach, 1997), they argue against, rather than for, pure
phenomenography.
In later papers, the prefix ‘pure’ is added to the term phenomenography to denote
the research process that was originally defined (Marton, 1986). This emphasizes the
generic nature of the research process and distinguishes it from other studies that
share the same educational focus as the original studies, irrespective of the approach
that is taken (Svensson, 1997, p. 164). For the remainder of this paper, phenomenog-
raphy, unless indicated otherwise, is used to refer to the process of research and
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should be read as ‘pure’ phenomenography. We shall also need to restrict our atten-
tion to one definition, and we concentrate on Marton’s view within the remainder of
the paper. Although some other approaches have been proposed (Hasselgren &
Beach, 1997) these do not appear to have found favour within research in ICTE.
These distinctions provide a set of principles that establishes phenomenography as
a qualitative approach to research that produces statements about how individuals can
describe, or equivalently be aware of, particular experiences, but phenomenography
is not unique in this. Other approaches to QA, based on different principles (e.g.
action research, discourse analysis, ethnomethodology, grounded theory, etc.), would
share the same interest in describing the ways in which individuals can understand
their experience of a phenomenon in a common ‘outer world’. Phenomenography
distinguishes itself from each of these in practice through at least one of three charac-
teristics that we consider in the remainder of this section: 
● the presumed objectivity of data collection;
● the structure of the outcome space as a hierarchy; and
● the characterization of this hierarchy as a limit to the experience of any individual.
In conventional phenomenography, qualitative accounts are collected, in a one-
pass approach, from a sample of subjects who share experiences of a particular
phenomenon. The typical approach for adults is to adopt a semi-structured interview
with a well-structured sample, but alternative approaches are possible (Marton &
Booth, 1997, pp. 131–132). The suggestion (Booth, 1997, p. 130) that a ‘theoretical
sample’ should be used, as in grounded theory, is not possible until the later stages of
a cyclical process of data collection. Sampling should be designed to capture diversity
rather than to produce a statistically balanced representation. Semi-structured
interviews add depth to the data, but this requires sensitivity to avoid the interview
becoming a ‘diagnostic discourse’ (Marton & Booth, 1997, p. 130) rather than an
exposition of the subject’s own perception. Analysis of these accounts is then treated
as a distinct stage. Few other approaches to QA would consider these accounts to be
so unaffected by the collection process.
The outcome space is characterized as a hierarchically structured, multi-
dimensional super-set of descriptions, where each subcomponent is a multi-faceted
issue or aspect bounded by a finite range of values. This needs to be considered in
two ways.
Firstly, we can consider the outcome space as the endpoint of an empirical process.
Since almost all other approaches to QA produce a similar super-index for the
language and terminology used by subjects, the major difference is that phenomenog-
raphy stops at this point. As an empirical analysis should be traceable, each part of
the hierarchy acts as a cross-reference to the original accounts from which it stems
(Säljö, 1996). Entwistle (1997) clearly recognizes that further processes are necessary
and outlines some principles for how a phenomenographic study should progress
beyond this. Other models of QA would certainly do so. Grounded theory (GT)
develops an axial model to represent the sequential aspects of an experience or
decision (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), while other approaches would be more concerned
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to explore normative aspects through consideration of frequency of recurrence, and
so forth. Despite Entwistle’s suggestion, phenomenographic studies are finished with
the production of the outcome space.
Secondly, the outcome-space is not just a super-index to the original accounts. As
Marton notes, ‘The set of categories is thus stable and generalizable between
situations, even if the individuals “move” from one category to another on different
occasions’ (1981, p. 194). In other words, for any well-defined phenomenon, there is
a fixed number of ways of conceiving of that reality (Marton, 1986, p. 42). This
provides strong constraints on how reality could be perceived, but within these places
no limitations on how individuals perceive any phenomenon on any occasion. A more
detailed account reflects a deeper awareness of that particular phenomenon at that
time, but that is a statement about the account, and not about the individual them-
selves. More complex experiences will reflect a higher level, or a more ‘authorized’
view of the world. In education this will normally be what the students should have
learned (as with deep/shallow learning). Outside education, the ‘authorized’ view
might reflect a higher level of scientific development, or more advanced cultural
development (Marton, 1981, p. 184).
Despite the significance of this super-index to phenomenography, relatively little is
written about the process by which it is derived—a process that is acknowledged to
be a ‘… discovery procedure which can be justified in terms of results, but not in
terms of method’ (Marton & Säljö, 1984). Instead, the phenomenographic researcher
is expected to gain an understanding of the process from reading a sufficient number
of case studies. Even so, apart from a description in that work, the case studies, as
published, provide little detail, whether the studies are from education (for example,
Booth, 1997; Svensson, 1997; Entwistle, 1997; Marton & Pang, 2003) or from more
diverse fields—for example, teaching and cultural analysis (Mugler & Landbeck,
1997), public policy (Irvine, 2002), and nursing (Widang & Fridlund, 2003).
In summary, phenomenography presents itself as a powerful research tool that
produces an objective, qualitative description to represent the way that individuals
perceive reality. For researchers in ICTE, it offers the possibility of encapsulating the
different perceptions of particular systems that are held by the designers, the educators
and the learners, with relatively limited cost in research time. However, in doing so,
some critical differences exist between phenomenography and other approaches to
QA. The evaluation study and the process study that follows allow these differences
to be explored in practice and in theory.
The next section covers the use of phenomenography in the most interesting strand
of the evaluation study. By choosing to do so, we can exclude aspects of the case study
that are too contextualized, and can retain sufficient details to illustrate the process
and support the critique of the process that follows within the remainder of the paper.
The evaluation study
As already noted, the evaluation study was designed to report on the experience of
teams of undergraduate students who were expected to collaborate on a multi-media
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design task. In this case, the students were on a multimedia design module at Level
Two in higher education.
Two software systems were available to support the students: the system that was
the focus of the evaluation (the tool), and the university’s learning-management
system. The tool provided support for coordinating work, collaboration in the
production of interim designs, and submitting work to deadlines. For academic staff,
the tool allowed the progress of each team to be monitored efficiently and feedback
to be given on the various components of the assignment as they were produced.
From the designers’ perspective, there was a particular interest in the extent to which
the students conceived of the tool as instrumental in supporting collaborative
working. The steps of the evaluation study will now be described in sequence.
Evaluation study: data collection
A number of factors restricted the options for data collection. Students needed to
have had sufficient opportunity to use the tool and deliver designs to the deadlines,
but their time was severely constrained, at that point in the semester, by the demands
of other studies. Students needed to be sufficiently willing to provide feedback, but,
ethically, they could not be required to do so. For both these reasons, self-selection
was agreed as the only option (and was taken up by 24 students from a total of 111).
The period over which data were collected and the time required from each student
was limited as far as possible. The data were collected as written responses to a single
prompt (Alsop & Tompsett, 2002) by the module leader. 
The prompt did not make direct reference to collaboration:
We would like you to concentrate on what you, personally, could identify as a single occa-
sion which you consider as the occasion (or one of the occasions) which was the best
educational experience when using NetPro or Blackboard.
We would like you to tell us about this event. Please write about 8–15 sentences in the
space below that outline the details of how the event occurred.
In comparison with semi-structured interviews, the accounts are collected in
parallel and without any further prompts. Each account is written and includes as
much information and detail, or as little, as the subject chooses. Both factors should
increase the objective nature of the data as individual accounts. Students do not have
any opportunity to influence each other, and the opportunity for the researchers to
influence the views of the subjects is limited. The subjects are familiar with presenting
a position as a written account and so, despite the lack of any interactive ‘discussion’,
this approach would still be classified as a ‘discursive’ model of data collection in
phenomenography (Hasselgren & Beach, 1997, p. 196). The collection of accounts
in parallel eliminates the risk that details, which have been presented in early inter-
views, might influence the pattern or detail of subsequent interviews.
Although the data were not collected conventionally, the accounts that were
collected showed sufficient variation in length, detail and content to support the
phenomenographic analysis that followed. In particular, from the designers’
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perspective, although no direct reference had been made to collaborative learning
within the prompt, collaboration did form an integral aspect of the students’
accounts of using the tool.
Evaluation study: analysis
Each account is one description of one experience, which is limited by what was
perceived by the individual at the time and considered to be relevant on this one occa-
sion. Phenomenographic analysis starts with these accounts as a ‘pool of experiences’
and develops a single ‘stripped’ description: ‘in which the structure and essential
meaning of the differing ways of experiencing the phenomenon are retained …’
(Marton & Booth, 1997, p. 114). Two principles guide the analysis. Firstly, that the
details within the accounts will be hierarchically structured (Booth, 1997, p. 138).
Secondly, it is argued that the model should be as ‘parsimonious’ as possible (Marton
& Booth, 1997, p. 125).
The model that was designed for the evaluation study is principally based on
Marton and Booth (1997, p. 114), with Marton and Säljö’s (1984) work providing
additional clarification. The process worked through three phases of analysis, each of
which could have triggered a reassessment of an earlier phase: 
1. structured reading: reading and re-reading all the experiences a number of times
to identify the key aspects/issues of a phenomenon;
2. identifying variation for each aspect/issue: reading the relevant cases to identify
the possible variation in the way this is experienced; and
3. structuring experiences: 
(a) separating into levels if possible, and
(b) clustering into an outcome space that is hierarchically structured.
(Note: The texts use the term aspect at both a macro and detailed level of analysis. In
this paper the word issue is used at the highest level, and aspect for lower levels.)
Phase 1: structured reading.   The relationship between the researcher and the
experiences collected from the subjects is considered to be that of an independent
observer. The researcher is expected to ‘step back consciously from her [sic] own
experience of the phenomena and use it only to illuminate ways in which others are
talking of it, handling it, experiencing it, and understanding it’ (Booth, 1997, p. 121).
A separation between data collection and analysis reinforces this, and emphasizes a
model of research in which the accounts are treated as objective data. In the structured
reading phase the complete set of accounts is read and re-read a number of times
before any attempt is made to make notes or begin a more formal analysis, even if this
does not always appear to be followed (for example, Ramsden et al., 1993). It is argued
that any analysis before re-reading may ‘fix’ the analysis on aspects, or details, that
appear important to the analyst in the first few cases, but that would not be significant
after reading the full set. In the evaluation study the full set was read three times.
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At the end of this phase, two issues became evident: issue A, submitting work; and
issue B, differences between the two technical systems. The next phase of analysis
cycles through each issue in isolation from the others.
Phase 2: identifying variation.   This phase represents a shift from identifying holistic
issues to capturing significant variation for one issue. On each cycle (a ‘freeze’; Marton
& Booth, 1997, p. 133), comments that are not relevant to that issue are ‘ignored’.
The criterion of parsimony requires that ‘similarity of view’ is captured by the researcher
within a single representative phrase or statement (termed comments from this point
onwards). Repetition of the same view is then ignored; phenomenography is intended
to define the limits of how a phenomenon is experienced rather than what is normative.
Each of the comments that remain can be traced back to at least one account, but is
now considered against the different comments that could be made about the same
issue. If the sample is selected appropriately this will represent all the possible comments
that can be made (Marton & Booth, 1997, p. 120). If the accounts are processed in
their original sequence and the comments retained in the sequence in which they are
first noted, this restricts the opportunity to over-interpret the data at this point.
For issue A, submitting work, there was little difficulty in identifying relevant
comments by elimination; comments were excluded if they were restricted to the
learning-management system or made a direct comparison of common features.
Table 1 provides the first list of comments (as noted and written by the original
Table 1. Issue 1: submitting work—separate comments, in order of first occurrence
Issue A, submitting work
a Loading a document up
b Loading a document up and getting a smiley facea
c Loading an empty document up and getting a smiley face
d Concerns that they could see each others’ work
e Concerns about them not sharing the work among each other
f Concerns that not all subjects look at the upload of information from a sharing point of view
g Positive identification that the exchange of ideas was available and possible
h Suggestion that security should not allow sharing by default—use passwords
i An advantage is that others can see your work
j People can copy
k Where are the grades?
l Doesn’t track changes in documents
m Could change the file type to PDF
n People can use your work to get ideas
o No feedback from staff
p You can see what had not been done yet
q More convenient to upload documents off site
aA visual clue that a file had loaded successfully.
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researcher) for this issue from the evaluation study, after the first stage of interpretive
coding.
Although this list appears to cover a wide range of aspects that might appear
disconnected in the table, each can be traced back to a link within the account of at
least one student. The richness of this variation provides a post-hoc validation of the
approach to data collection that was used. A more detailed level of coding is intro-
duced in the following phase.
Phase 3: structuring experiences.   The outcome of this phase is ‘categories of descrip-
tion’ and is well defined. The process by which this is achieved, as noted before, is
unclear. Marton and Booth comment that these descriptions should: 
as a rule, form a hierarchy … defined in terms of increasing complexity, in which the differ-
ent ways of experiencing the phenomenon in question can be defined as subsets of the
component parts and relationships within more inclusive or complex ways of seeing the
phenomenon. (Marton & Booth, 1997, p. 125)
They continue: ‘The different ways of experiencing the phenomenon can even be
seen as different layers of individual experiences’. From this, complexity appears to
be as a property of an account that emphasizes the detail that is included, although
this phase is based on the comments themselves. This suggests that certain comments
would only occur within complex accounts—but this does not allow for inclusiveness.
This seems to suggest that some comments would only occur if lower levels of
experience had to be there, even if relevant comments have not been included in any
one account.
In reality, the first part of phase 3, ‘separating into layers if possible’, involved two
interlinked processes. At a macro level, comments were subdivided into four aspects:
‘loading a document’, ‘managing files’, ‘sharing’ and ‘feedback’. These four aspects
could be layered by exploiting inclusiveness. For example, none of the comments on
sharing would make sense unless the subject was already aware that files could be
managed within their own workspace. The reverse would not necessarily be true.
On a more detailed level, a local structure was based on a more systematic coding
of closely related expressions and, where necessary, a reapplication of the principle of
inclusivity. As a simple illustration of systematic coding we consider the four
comments (a, b, c, q) from Table 1 that refer to ‘loading a document’. Coding and
sequencing across a small set is relatively unproblematic. Table 2 presents these,
together with their coding in the sequence that was provided by the researcher. The
numbers in the first column are taken from the final ranking that was produced.
Specific issues in coding are now discussed.
With larger and more diverse sets, such as the eight comments that were identified
as relevant to sharing, a more detailed analysis is necessary. Table 3 presents these
comments arranged into six levels (6–11), again with the researcher’s notes and
coding. Figure 1 shows the aspect within a hierarchical structure. Although there is
insufficient space to justify this sequence, it provides a good example to illustrate how
complexity and inclusivity interact within a more structured coding system.
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Figure 1. Hierarchical structure to sharingIn this case, the comments that discuss the exchange of files (levels 6 and 7) are set
below those that refer, or imply, an exchange of ideas (levels 8–11). Even though
none of the individual comments makes an explicit comparison of the two terms, the
researcher considered that the exchange of ideas between teams in the workspace
requires that the relevant files can be exchanged, but, as above, the reverse would not
necessarily hold true. Within the set that covered the exchange of ideas, those that
discussed sharing as ‘learning’ rather than exchange seemed to represent a deeper
level of understanding of the purpose of the system. The comment at level 11, which
implies that the ‘design’ of the tool was not fixed, also provides a good example where
complexity sets this comment above the previous level.
Table 2. Loading a document: sequenced in decreasing levels with structured coding
Submitting work: loading a document Final coding
4 q: More convenient to upload documents off site [Loading: off-site]
3 c: Loading a document up and getting a smiley face [Loading: confirmation]
2 b: Loading an empty document up and getting a 
smiley face
[Loading: confirmation and empty]
1 a: Loading a document up [Loading]
Table 3. Sharing sequenced in decreasing levels with structured coding
Initial coding Researcher’s note (verbatim) Coding
11 h: Suggestion that security 
should not allow sharing by 
default—use passwords
A wish to share work, but to have 
choice. Suggestion that security 
should not allow sharing by 
default—use passwords who to 
share it with
[Sharing: +ve, with 
choice, ideas]
10 g: Positive identification that 
the exchange of ideas was 
available and possible




i: an advantage is that others 
can see your …
9 f: Concerns that not all 
subjects look at the upload 
of information from a 
sharing point of view
Recognition that not all view 




8 n: People can use your work 
to get ideas
Recognition that sharing will aid 
the work of others
[Sharing: +ve, ideas]
7 m: Could change the file type 
to PDF
Opportunity to share work 




6 d: Concerns that they could 
see each other’s work
Sharing work leading to concerns 
about plagiarism
[Sharing: −ve]
j: people can copy
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In the hierarchical representation, higher levels either include new aspects (e.g.
choice, learning) or replace one value with another. When particular values are
considered to be juxtaposed, they appear on different strands of the hierarchy.
Once this process is completed for each aspect of the issue, then a complete hier-
archy for this issue can be produced. An outline of the hierarchy for submitting work
is provided in Figure 2. As the hierarchy for sharing is already included in Figure 1,
only the first three layers of this aspect are shown.
Figure 2. Outline of outcome space for issue A, submitting workAt the final level, when integration occurs across all the issues, then the analysis is
complete. Phenomenographers argue that this index gains predictive power: if a suit-
able set of accounts has been collected, then any future account must also conform
to the same structure.
For the evaluation study, predictive power would be of little value. The outcomes
of this study would be relevant to any users of the same software, but the intention of
the designers was to alter the software and to change, and hopefully improve, the
experience of the students. In such a situation the designer would, ideally, be able to
predict what will stay the same and what will change. However, a phenomenographic
study cannot make such a separation!
This does not reduce the potential of phenomenography as a research tool. The
study provides evidence that the students can perceive the tool as instrumental to
their learning. However, this potential could be questioned if the process is not as
inherently valid as is claimed. It is this issue that is considered in the process study.
Process study
A teachback exercise is based on Pask’s conversation theory (Pask, 1977), and
requires a ‘novice’ to coach an ‘expert’ through solving a problem. This allows the
‘expert’ to explore the layers of understanding of the novice, beyond the ability to





























Figure 1. Hierarchical structure to sharing
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researcher, acting as an expert in QA, through the evaluation of the case study as a
particular example of qualitative research. The second researcher provided a critical
framework within which the key distinctions between phenomenography and other
approaches to QA were highlighted. When a more detailed understanding of
phenomenography was required, additional sources were checked (for example,
Marton, 1994), but, in terms of pure phenomenography, these either confirmed what
was written elsewhere or veered from the guidelines that would appear to distinguish
pure phenomenography from other approaches to QA.
The teachback exercise eliminated discussion of what would be sound practice in
any approach to QA, but this section can only act as a summary of the many cycles
of exposition, explanation, challenge, reading and re-reading of the literature that
were involved. We focus, in particular, on three key differences between phenom-
enography and other approaches to QA: 
● The collection of data.
● The independence of the outcomes from the researcher.























Figure 2. Outline of outcome space for issue A, submitting work
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As we consider each of these, we attempt to understand whether these differences
should occur, ‘on principle’, from the underlying model of knowledge (as with the
first) or whether it occurs, de facto, from a difference in practice (as with the last). We
conclude this section with some concerns, which are raised from the process study.
Collection of data
Two inter-related factors are distinctive in data collection: single-pass collection, and
the independence of data collection from analysis.
Single-pass data collection, collecting all the data before analysis begins, is atypical
in QA where a grounded model is developed. The starkest contrast to the single-pass
model would be GT. From a GT perspective, any interaction with subjects is
interpreted through the mind of the researcher—so data collection entails analysis. In
almost all other cases, data collection and analysis are recursive. In any of these
approaches the researcher should be self-aware (Ashmore, 1989, p. 32) and
document the progressive interaction of their personal understanding of the phenom-
enon and analysis as field notes. In phenomenography the opposite is the case: data
are collected as objective accounts, with no suggestion that subsequent interviews or
studies would be needed.
This view of data collection is a direct consequence of the model of awareness that
underpins phenomenography. Each subject develops their personal understanding of
a phenomenon through an unstructured sequence of experiences, but this awareness
cannot be observed. All that is collected for analysis by the phenomenographer is a
set of individual accounts of similar experiences. Each account is bounded by what
the subject is aware of on one single occasion, and this account cannot be interpreted
as a limit on either what the individual could be aware of in the future, or, indeed,
might have been aware of in the past.
If data collection allowed an account to be revisited in order to ‘add’ to it, then this
would imply that the subject’s account needed to conform to some standard model.
Separating data collection from analysis ensures that this cannot take place and
provides ‘empirical data’ for the analysis that follows. Even if additional cases were to
be collected, the protocol to be followed for any new case could not be changed.
However, objectivity in data collection can only ensure that the first stage of research
is independent of the researcher.
Independence of the outcomes from the researcher
For almost all other approaches to QA, it is presumed that the analytical phase must
be dependent on the researcher even if it is then argued that the conclusions become
independent. In such cases, it is expected, as intimated by Entwistle (1997), that
additional conditions must be met, as with ‘theoretical saturation’ in GT (Glaser &
Strauss, 1967).
The ‘in principle’ justification for this difference appears, on first consideration, to
be promising. There is an evident similarity between the development of understanding
254 G. Alsop and C. Tompsett
in a subject, and the development of an outcome space by the analyst. Each learner
develops an understanding of a phenomenon through a number of different
experiences, and a description of one experience is captured, in a structured format,
and treated as objective data. Similarly, the researcher develops an understanding of
‘reading an account’ through experiencing ‘reading an account’ a number of times.
This researcher’s understanding is then captured, in a structured format, as the
outcome space and considered to be objective. However, the similarity breaks down
when considered in more detail. The data that are collected from each subject is an
individual account. Different subjects would be expected to produce different accounts
even if they chose to describe the same experience. On the same basis, the outcome
space that is produced by one researcher is a representation of their understanding,
and different researchers should expect to produce different outcome spaces (see
R-reference; Ashmore, 1989, p. 32). Far from justifying independence (Marton &
Booth, 1997, p. 125), the ‘in principle’ argument suggests that the outcome space
should depend on the researcher.
If there is no additional test to justify independence, and the ‘in principle’ argument
fails, we are able to consider the possibility that this is established through practice in
the specific case of the evaluation study. To do so we would need to consider each
phase in turn, although the first two are relatively unproblematic.
Phase 1, structured reading, is distinctive from other approaches to QA as there is
a specific requirement to ‘hold back’ from interpretation, but this particular phase
can be justified ‘in principle’. The phenomenographic model of understanding does
not require individuals to reflect on each experience, but captures the response to a
specific example after understanding has developed. Structured reading reflects the
same principle. Phase 2 is common to all forms of QA. Each will require that the
language, or rather the data, is collected, and converted into a more restricted code
(e.g. sharing, +ve, choice, ideas). At this point, any comment or term in the code acts
as a denotational marker that points to some text within one or more accounts.
When taken in isolation, any comment, such as ‘Loading an empty document up and
getting a smiley face’, can be interpreted in at least three ways: as a ‘criticism’ (‘the
system should have spotted an incorrect file’), as ‘cheating’ (’the system believed that
work was submitted on time’) or even as a ‘insight into future design changes’ (‘the
system doesn’t check to see if a file is empty—they could do that in the next
version!’). However, each of these adds connotation to what it represents, and the
most valid interpretation should be taken from the actual accounts, and the alterna-
tive ways of expressing related ideas in similar accounts. Up to the end of phase 2 this
is unproblematic. Any issues of concern here would be common to any other
approach to QA.
On a larger scale, where a larger number of cases have been collected, some tests
have been conducted to demonstrate multi-coder reliability. However, these are to
predetermined coding frameworks, at the end of this phase, and they do not test
whether different phenomenographers would produce the same coding structures
when presented with the same set of accounts (Sandberg, 1997, p. 205)—that is,
before phase 1.
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Phase 3 should be more difficult to justify: by the end of this phase the outcome
space should be independent of the original accounts, and so the meaning of any
terms must become ‘fixed’ by other parts of the process—but must only be esta-
blished from patterns within the data. When this phase of the evaluation study was
reviewed during the teachback process, some anomalies arose over the concepts of
complexity and inclusiveness within the final model. Two, in particular, suggested
that additional value systems were influencing the final model, rather than the data
itself.
The first anomaly arises from the suggestion that increasing complexity should
reflect a higher level of understanding. This problem arose when we considered a
more abstract coding of Table 2 (see Table 4). In this we have used abstract letters
to ensure that the complexity of what is written is considered. When the code is
stripped of any additional meaning, it is difficult to argue that the sequence that was
produced in this phase in the evaluation study is justified. The comment at level 2
seems more complex than any of the others, and those at level 3 and 4 appear equally
complex.
On reflection, the justification for this final sequence depended on the intended use
of the tool as understood by the researcher conducting the analysis. As a tool for
collaborative learning, the inclusion of ‘B’ (‘cheating’) has negative connotations,
while the only comment that might even suggest an awareness of this possibility is ‘A’
(off-site). Although the example seems trivial, if it exists at this level then it is certain
to be harder to detect and justify on a more complex example. The use of an external
value system, as occurred implicitly in this case, can always be justified as part of the
analysis, if it is acknowledged and independently justified. Once the possibility is
raised that a value system has been introduced in this way, it might offer a different
motivation for treating exchange of ideas above exchange of files (as in Table 3). There
is a risk, however, that value systems are introduced unwittingly. If the best ways of
understanding a phenomenon matches the ‘authorized’ view (Marton, 1981, p. 184),
there is a risk that the researcher finds what they expect to find. This problem does
not necessarily imply that the outcomes are dependent on the researcher, nor invali-
date the analysis if such ‘values’ can be justified by the context of the research.
However, it would seem essential to recognize that value systems that are external to
the data are needed to convert simple complexity into levels of understanding. Neither
should the justification be post hoc—that only informs you about the researcher’s
values, or why certain ‘authorized’ versions are so readily found in educational studies.
Table 4. Table 2 redrawn with abstract codes
Submitting work: loading a document Aspect: features
4 [Loading: off-site] X: A
3 [Loading: confirmation] X: C
2 [Loading: confirmation and empty] X: B and C
1 [Loading] X
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The second anomaly appeared to be the dependence on the use of presumed
inclusiveness. The comments on sharing from the evaluation study provide the most
evident example, although this was not needed at the levels above this—all the
feedback comments occurred in accounts that also included comments on sharing.
However, if the principle is over-used, there is a risk that an implicit decision is taken
to place a comment at an ‘authorized’ level and then justify the additional details as
a post-hoc rationalization. This would also become harder to notice in larger studies
with more data and ‘discovery’ as the only process of development.
There remains the possibility that the method of data collection that was used in
the evaluation study limited the complexity within the accounts. A request to produce
more detailed, multi-layered accounts offers no direct benefit to any subject in doing
so. However, if this is considered to be a possibility, then so is the converse: that a
semi-structured approach generates accounts that are deeper (Webb, 1997). If this
were so, then ‘natural’ complexity could be created by a willingness to conform to the
interview setting (see Säljö, 1997), rather than being a simple reflection of the
individual’s own awareness.
The generalizability of the outcomes
Phenomenography makes specific claims regarding the models that are created: once
a model is discovered, then the understanding of every suitable subject of the same
phenomenon must fit within the model. This claim is far stronger than most approaches
to QA, even if the scope of the terms ‘suitable’ and ‘phenomenon’ might always allow
counter-examples to be excluded as unsuitable or a different phenomenon.
Where other approaches produce a similar super-index as the endpoint of the
research, they limit its meaning by the way it was produced. It is no more than a
multi-dimensional index to the original accounts (for example, Säljö, 1997). Other
approaches would require a test for validity, either at this stage, or after building a
more complex model (e.g. ‘theoretical saturation’ in GT; Glaser & Strauss, 1967).
Without any further test, and without any clear indication that the outcome space is
independent of both the sample used and of the researcher, an ‘in principle’ argument
seems unlikely.
From an ‘in practice’ perspective, the evaluation study is of limited assistance here.
Students had to have studied on the module for a sufficiently long period of time to
collect any relevant accounts, and beyond that point they were too committed to
other assessments to allow a suitable empirical test; that is, to collect further cases and
demonstrate that they do conform to the model. However, the literature is more
useful here. Examples have been discovered where the categories of description have
had to be modified, even with examples that were central to the original work in
education. Following studies in other cultures in the early 1990s (Marton & Booth,
1997, pp. 39–45) it became clear that concepts that are central to the early work in
phenomenography, such as ‘rote learning’ and deep and shallow learning, have had
to be revised in specific subjects. This problem was ‘resolved’ by refining some critical
terms, but the need to do this suggests that other issues would need empirical testing.
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This suggests that the models are valid until they are shown to be invalid. This may
be a problem that is shared with scientific models of knowledge, but the evidence for
generalizability, in the case of phenomenography, seems far less than claimed.
The scope of phenomenography
The three issues discussed so far (collection of data, independence of the outcomes
from the researcher and generalizability of the outcomes) all arose from the evaluation
study, but the process study itself raised issues. This suggests that there is a limit to
what can be observed within a phenomenographic study.
The concern arises from the timelessness of the phenomenographic research
model. Data collection captures single ‘snapshot’ images for each individual and
accepts that this is just one account from the wider set of accounts they could have
produced. Since there is no attempt to ‘assess’ each student, there need be no concern
whether this account is typical for this student or not. Phenomenography focuses only
on the ‘experience per se’—a current, individual explanation, without concern to
understand previous experience as a formative process. Phenomenography describes
what a deeper understanding might be, and the variation that might be experienced
(Bowden & Marton, 1998), but not how this transfers to learning.
A second concern, which we characterize as collaborative accounting, follows on
from this and reflects one of the distinctions between phenomenography and
phenomenology. In the evaluation study, as elsewhere, the subjects will have
developed their own awareness of this phenomenon and, on a number of occasions,
discussed (accounted for) these experiences with other individuals, including
members of their team. This opens up the possibility that the accounts that are
collected at a later stage for analysis reflect previous patterns of accounting and
provide an equally plausible justification for the limited number of ‘possible experi-
ences’ that are found in this study, and indeed in any phenomenographic study. A
similar effect would occur if the users are instructed or informed as to how they
should use a system (as noted in a study by Orlikowski, 1992), and reflect this back
as ‘the right answer’. If we even allow the possibility these effects could influence the
accounts that are produced, then the data collected are no longer objective (Bain-
bridge, 1981; Edwards & Mercer, 1987; Säljö, 1996).
Conclusions
None of these four issues are fatal to ‘pure’ phenomenography as an approach to QA,
but each of them (data collection, independence of the results from the researcher,
status of the results and scope of what is researched) provides a challenge.
In data collection, there is a thin line to be drawn between a method that will tease
out an account of an experience, without the process corrupting or distorting the
data, and removing the ‘objectivity’ that is claimed.
The independence of the results from the research can only be established if the
researcher acknowledges that the analysis cannot be conducted without recognition
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that ‘their’ values influence the coding that is used; that is, that independence requires
both self-awareness and management.
The claim that the outcome space must limit any future descriptions seems
unproven and may be unnecessary. If the impact of research in ICTE is to change
future experiences, then it is difficult to see why we need to generalize across systems
that cease to exist. However, without this claim, the outcome space of a phenomeno-
graphic study could be reduced to a useful cross-index. In that case, it could be
argued, the outcome space has no special properties and ‘pure phenomenography’
offers nothing that is new.
Finally, the limitations on scope would appear impossible to address within
phenomenography. Indeed, how can the development of understanding within an
inherently social educational environment be researched if the model of knowledge
can only capture accounts of isolated experiences, no matter how regulated these may
be?
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